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1. President Donald Trump, Remarks Before Marine One Departure, (July 12, 2019).
2. Christina Zhao, ‘Article 2’ Trends After Trump Falsely Claims it Gives Him Unlimited Powers
as President: I Can ‘Do Whatever I Want’, NEWSWEEK (July 23, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/article-2-trends-after-trump-falsely-claims-it-grants-him-unlimited-powers-president-i-can-do-1450798
[https://perma.cc/2DFH-K382].
3. See Colleen Long & Michael Warren, Trump’s Idea of Executive Power is Also Impeachment
Defense,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan.
25,
2020),
https://apnews.com/b2d16168986dd61accd475143c544665 [https://perma.cc/U6KW-AJJW] (“Not since Richard
Nixon[‘s statement] has a president come close to making an assertion of power as sweeping as
Trump’s.”).
4. See Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors (“Articles of Impeachment”), H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019). See also Trump
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President Trump is fond of citing the breadth of his powers and privileges. He has explained, for example, that there is “a thing called Article II”
of the Constitution that “gives me all of these rights at a level that nobody
has ever seen before.” 1 Elsewhere, he has elaborated that “Article II allows
me to do whatever I want.” 2 These statements have been roundly criticized,
with commentators comparing them to Richard Nixon’s infamous assertion
that, “when the President does it, that means it is not illegal.”3 As with
Nixon’s words, however, Trump’s conception of Article II is grounded in
something more than one man’s grandiose delusions. Rather, Trump’s assertions of power and privilege are symptomatic of a long trend toward presidential imperialism. At the same time, they are especially brazen and
dangerous manifestations of the same.
Trump’s efforts to stymie the congressional inquiries that led to his impeachment encapsulate his dual role as both symptom and agent of excessive
presidential power. His actions reflect and further threaten to exacerbate the
President’s alarmingly broad capacity to control the information that Congress and the people are able to learn about his activities. Yet neither
Trump’s behavior, nor the Senate’s failure to convict him on either of the
two articles of impeachment passed by the House—including the second article, for “Obstruction of Congress” 4—must, inevitably, enhance presidential
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Impeachment Results: How Democrats and Republicans Voted, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeachment-vote-results.html
[https://perma.cc/PSJ9-N6SB]; Joanna Walters, What Are the Articles of Impeachment Against Donald
Trump?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/20/what-aretrump-articles-of-impeachment [https://perma.cc/MR3P-LD7G].
5. Professor Mary Dudziak (@marydudziak), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2020, 2:53 PM), https://twitter.com/marydudziak/status/1223348502757019652 [https://perma.cc/TNS2-TAY4].
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part I.
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power going forward. Whether the Trump era normalizes ever bolder assertions of power, or whether it has quite a different effect—for instance, causing a backlash against such assertions—remains to be seen. As legal historian
Mary Dudziak observed in the wake of the Senate’s vote to acquit Trump on
both articles of impeachment: “past practice has not bound the present . . . .
[Political branch] precedent is just a form of contemporary political argument.” 5 The longer-term implications of Trump’s actions and the House and
Senate impeachment proceedings, in short, are up to the actions and arguments of our own and of future generations.
In this Essay, I take both a wide and a long view of President Trump’s
refusal to comply with any congressional information requests relating to his
impeachment.6 That is, I consider how his intransigence reflects and thus far,
has exacerbated judicial and political branch trends favoring presidential
power. Looking to the future, I acknowledge that executive aggrandizement
episodes tend to build on themselves, contributing to a ratchet effect that
enhances presidential power. I argue, however, that this one-way trajectory
is not inevitable.
In Part I, I look to judicial precedent involving executive privilege. Although few inter-branch disputes over information reach the courts, judicial
precedent helps to shape the parameters within which political branch approaches to these disputes take place. On the whole, courts have been fairly
sensitive to the interests of Congress and others in obtaining presidential information. 7 Yet they also have armed Presidents with legal arguments and
tools that enhance their already significant advantages in inter-politicalbranch tussles. In Part II, I consider these advantages, including a formidable
executive branch legal infrastructure adept at turning past acts of presidential
secret-keeping into “historical gloss” to justify yet more extreme secrecy. In
Part III, I situate President Trump’s uses of executive privilege and its
shadow within the broader contexts explored in the preceding sections.
Trump’s actions rely on longstanding tools and trends but employ them in
ways more extreme—and more threatening to inter-branch checks and balances—than we have seen in the past. President Trump’s categorical refusal
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to cooperate with the House impeachment proceedings, his directive to others in his Administration to do the same, and his efforts to punish and intimidate those officials who did cooperate with the House, take defiance of
oversight to new heights. 8 In this Essay’s conclusion, I consider the bearing
that these events might have on future Presidents, congresses, and courts.
Although presidential power often serves as a one-way ratchet, there are exceptions to this rule. Indeed, some presidential abuses become anti-canonical
and spark a backlash against future such actions. 9 President Trump’s obstruction deserves to meet this fate.
I. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY IN THE
COURTS

11/23/2020 10:40:39

8. See infra Part III.
9. Deborah Pearlstein suggests as much in a new article, explaining that executive branch precedent can become anti-canonical under some conditions. Deborah Pearlstein, The Executive Branch Anticanon, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
10. The other subcategory is the common law “deliberative process” privilege. See Heidi Kitrosser,
The Shadow of Executive Privilege, 15 THE FORUM 547, 550 n.12 (2017) (citing In re Sealed Case, 121
F.3d 729, 737, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
11. See, e.g., MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 44–49 (3d ed. 2010); Mark J. Rozell & Mitchel A. Sollenberger, Executive Privilege
and the U.S. Attorney Firings, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 315, 316 (2008).
12. See ROZELL, supra note 11, at 73.
13. See Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 550–51.
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Executive privilege—and here I focus solely on that subset of the privilege involving presidential communications 10—is the doctrine sometimes
invoked by Presidents as a basis to decline to provide requested information
to members of Congress, to courts, or to the public. At the heart of the privilege is the notion that forced information disclosures can undermine the
President’s ability to exercise his Article II powers and duties. 11
The trajectory of executive privilege’s breadth is not perfectly linear.
For example, President Nixon’s failed assertion of an absolute privilege
against disclosing his oval office tapes, along with the scandals that engulfed
his Administration more broadly, inspired some reticence to invoke the privilege on the parts of subsequent Presidents.12 Nonetheless, a number of factors have tended, overall, to give executive privilege a ratchet effect,
expanding its reach and emboldening those who wield it over time. This is
especially true with respect to disputes between the political branches, most
of which never reach the courts. 13
To understand how executive privilege tends to expand outside of the
courts, it is helpful to begin, paradoxically, by looking to the judiciary. The
paucity of judicial opinions on the privilege give the handful that exist a good
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14. 418 U.S. 683, 707–08. (1974).
15. Id. at 705–09. For in-depth analysis and critique of the candor rationale, see Gia B. Lee, The
President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 204–05 (2008).
16. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
17. Id. at 713–14.
18. Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2009,
at C7 (quoted in Heidi Kitrosser, The Shadow of Executive Privilege, 15 THE FORUM 547, 551 (2017)).
See also Helene Cooper & Rachel L. Swarns, At Obama’s First State Dinner, the First Crashers, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
25,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/26/us/politics/26crashers.html
[https://perma.cc/3CH2-G3EC].
19. See examples cited in Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 551 n.18.
20. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710–11.
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deal of influence over the arguments that are made or considered by participants in information-sharing disputes between the political branches. Overall, courts have built a doctrine that is rife with tools for the executive to
wield in inter-branch disputes, even as they have pushed back against some
of the most extreme invocations of the privilege.
Most notably, in United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court recognized
the privilege for the first time and also deemed it one that presumptively
favors the executive.14 More so, the U.S. v. Nixon Court embraced the “candor rationale,” or the chilling effect that disclosure might have on Presidents’
abilities to obtain candid advice, as one justification for the privilege.15 Although the Court cautioned that the presumption might readily be overcome
when its assertion “depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of
public interest in the confidentiality of [high-level] conversations”16—indeed, the Court characterized Nixon’s own claims as such and found them
outweighed by countervailing interests17—the candor rationale is intrinsically expansive. The rationale’s nearly limitless potential is captured by an
early usage of it in the Obama Administration. In the wake of a controversy
over security at a state dinner—one sparked by a reality television star’s
gaining entrance to said dinner without an invitation—the White House explained that its “social secretary is immune from testifying before Congress
‘[b]ased on the separation of powers’ and the need for ‘the White House staff
to provide advice to the [P]resident confidentially.’”18 Beyond this striking
example, administrations of both parties have cited the candor rationale
many times since U.S. v. Nixon, both in opposing information requests and
in objecting to proposed statutory information-sharing requirements. 19
The U.S. v. Nixon Court also suggested that a much stronger presumption would apply to a privilege claim grounded in national security. 20 Just
two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit admonished a district court for deferring too strongly to a national securitybased executive privilege claim raised in response to a congressional
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21. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 385–86, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The appeals court encouraged the branches to resolve the matter through negotiations, but stressed that the negotiations should
be informed by assumptions of shared congressional and executive responsibility for foreign affairs, rather than executive supremacy. Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 553 (citing United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d
at 390–95).
22. See examples cited in Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 552 n.21–22.
23. 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 731–33.
26. Id. at 731.
27. See Jonathan David Shaub, The Executive’s Privilege, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (explaining that “the executive branch view is that the only applicable balancing test to an
assertion of executive privilege against Congress is the [D.C. Circuit’s] ‘demonstrably critical’ test”). See
also examples cited in Kitrosser, supra note 10 at 552 n.24.
28. 542 U.S. at 375, 388–90 (2004). See also In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 725, 727, 731 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (discussing separation of powers issues, ordering case dismissed on remand).
29. 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 106 n.8 (D.D.C. 2008)). The Court instead required such advisors to appear,
at which point they could object to particular questions. Id. at 102–03.
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subpoena. 21 Nonetheless, administrations have repeatedly cited the national
security rationale in objecting to information requests or proposed statutory
requirements. 22
Administrations also routinely cite the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 23 a case that preceded U.S. v. Nixon by two months.
Whereas U.S. v. Nixon involved a subpoena issued by a district court in the
context of a criminal prosecution, Senate Select Committee concerned the
Nixon Administration’s refusal to turn over information to a congressional
committee. 24 The D.C. Circuit validated the Administration’s demurral, concluding that the committee had not overcome a presumption in favor of executive privilege. 25 To overcome the presumption, a committee must show
that the information it seeks is “demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s functions.”26 Administrations regularly invoke
that standard to support refusals to disclose information in a range of settings. 27
Courts also have given fuel to administrations seeking to minimize the
procedural steps that they must take before they can benefit from executive
privilege. In Cheney v. United States in 2004, the Supreme Court held that
Vice President Cheney did not need to invoke executive privilege or identify
parts of a discovery request that infringed the privilege; rather, he could object to the entire request on the basis that parts of it might trigger the privilege. 28 Although Cheney can be construed quite narrowly—indeed, the
District Court for the District of Columbia refused to interpret Cheney to
encompass absolute testimonial immunity for high-level advisors in 2008 in
House Judiciary Committee v. Miers 29—Cheney offers a tantalizing tool for
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30. See, e.g., Shaub, supra note 27, at 40, 44 (identifying the “seeds of the prophylactic executive
privilege” in Cheney and noting that “a protective assertion” made to stave off more specific claims of
privilege “dispenses with any need to analyze the specific information” and congressional needs for the
same).
31. See Charlotte Butash & Margaret Taylor, Oral Arguments in the D.C. Circuit En Banc Consideration of Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn and U.S. House of Representatives Mnuchin,
LAWFAREBLOG.COM (Apr. 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/WR5D-TK3L].
32. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U. S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, No. 19-5331 at 37
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).
33. See infra note 34.
34. McGahn, No. 19-5331 at 38, 48–50, 53–57 (Henderson, J., concurring); id. at 72–74 (Rogers,
J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 7–12, 37.
36. Specifically, the majority declined to decide whether standing would exist should a Committee
have statutory authorization, rather than rely solely on internal congressional rules, to issues subpoenas.
Id. at 35–36.
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administrations nonetheless. The appeal of gaining executive privilege’s
benefits without incurring the potential political, legal, or practical hassles
of actually invoking it is self-evident. 30
Finally, in House Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, a panel of the
D.C. Circuit recently strengthened the White House’s hand in informationsharing disputes with Congress. As this Article was in its final editing stages,
the D.C. Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc. The rehearing order vacates the panel decision, and the case remains pending as this Article goes to
press. 31 I review the panel opinion, as well as the concurring and dissenting
opinions, nonetheless. I do so both to preview whatever will follow from the
full court, and because the opinions are striking in their own rights.
The McGahn panel refused to enforce a subpoena issued by the House
Judiciary Committee for testimony by President Trump’s former White
House Counsel Don McGahn. 32 Two of the three judges on the panel (Judge
Henderson, who wrote separately but concurred in the opinion of the Court,
and Judge Rogers, who dissented) rejected McGahn’s claim to absolute immunity. 33 Like the district court judge in Miers (and the district court judge
from whose opinion McGahn had appealed), Henderson and Rogers concluded that McGahn should appear before the committee, at which point he
could object to particular requests on executive privilege or other grounds. 34
However, two of the three panel judges (Judge Griffith, who wrote for the
Court and Judge Henderson) held that the Committee lacked standing to seek
judicial enforcement of the subpoena.35 Although the panel left open the prospect of congressional standing under narrow circumstances in future
cases, 36 the decision, for the most part, rejects congressional committee access to courts to enforce subpoenas to current or former Presidential advisors.
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In his opinion for the panel, Judge Griffith stressed that Congress has
other means available to it to obtain information that concerns the President:
“Congress (or one of its chambers) may hold officers in contempt, withhold
appropriations, refuse to confirm the President’s nominees, harness public
opinion, delay or derail the President’s legislative agenda, or impeach recalcitrant officers.” 37 Congress can do these things, he added, “without dragging
judges into the fray.” 38 As Judge Rogers pointed out in her dissent, however,
there are serious practical limits on Congress’ ability to bring contempt proceedings, including a longstanding Justice Department policy against prosecuting criminal contempt actions against executive branch officials who
refuse to testify for executive privilege based reasons. 39 Impeachment also
is more intertwined with judicial enforcement than Judge Griffith suggests,
as I discuss in Part III. Most fundamentally, Judge Griffith overlooks the
reality that information disputes between Congress and the White House take
place in the shadow of judicial enforcement, even in the bulk of cases that
never make their way to a courthouse. As Judge Rogers writes, “[a]t least
since the 1970s, the political Branches have negotiated their informational
disputes against the backdrop of possible resort to the courts. By foreclosing
that possibility going forward, the panel would diminish the incentive the
executive branch might have to reach an accommodation.” 40
II. HISTORY’S GLOSS AND THE EXECUTIVE’S OTHER TOOLS

11/23/2020 10:40:39

37. Id. at 13.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 69–71 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 81 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
41. See Shaub, supra note 27, at 9 (quoting Memorandum for John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Re: Power of Congressional Committee to Compel Appearance or Testimony of “White House
Staff,” at 6–7 (Feb. 5, 1971)).
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Judicial precedents thus contain ample ammunition for administrations
to use in fighting with Congress over information. The ammunition’s power
is compounded by several other advantages. First, administrations benefit
greatly from being the parties who possess the sought-after information. As
such, the status quo intrinsically favors them.41 In recognizing a constitutional executive privilege, let alone a presumptive one with broadly articulated bases, courts give Presidents a valuable means to prolong the status
quo. The most obvious way for administrations to achieve this is by formally
citing the privilege and triggering litigation, beginning a drawn-out process
of inter-branch negotiation, or leading legislators simply to abandon their
quest for information. Administrations can achieve similar ends—the latter
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two being especially important in light of litigation’s infrequency and the
hurdles to initiating it—without formally citing the privilege. Instead, they
might simply allude to separation of powers concerns or suggest that they
wish to preserve the option of invoking the privilege at a later date.
Second, the executive branch has a formidable legal infrastructure at its
disposal, one unmatched by any congressional equivalent. 42 In particular, the
executive can call upon the resources of the Department of Justice and its
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”). 43 OLC’s legal opinions are enormously
influential, in part because they fill the void caused by the relative rarity of
judicial interference in executive power disputes.”44 OLC is well equipped
to draw on the handful of existing judicial opinions on executive privilege,
which themselves tilt in favor of executive power on the whole.45 Subsequent
OLC opinions can and do, of course, draw on past OLC opinions, contributing to a ratchet effect in favor of executive power.46
More so, OLC—as well as those engaged in informal inter-branch negotiations or litigation—frequently draw upon “the historical gloss of political branch precedents to support present-day executive actions. The
supported actions themselves can become precedent for future administrations to cite, contributing to a one-way ratchet toward enhanced presidential
power and secrecy.” 47 Modern presidential administrations have invoked executive privilege precedent in ways that keenly reflect this phenomenon. For
example, President Eisenhower’s Administration was the first to coin the
term “executive privilege” and the first to invoke the candor rationale to support it. 48 It also took the view that “the President and the heads of departments have an uncontrolled discretion to withhold . . . information and
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 41 Side B
11/23/2020 10:40:39

42. Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 557–58. Indeed, the mismatch between executive and congressional
legal resources “has been exacerbated over the past couple of decades. In this timeframe, Congress has—
for reasons themselves attributed by observers to a party-over-institution ethic—taken a hatchet to its own
internal sources of expertise.” Id. at 558.
43. See, e.g., Trevor Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1448, 1451 (2010) (describing OLC’s role and importance).
44. Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 557 (citing JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 32, 96–
97 (2007)); Morrison, supra note 43, at 1451. See also Shaub, supra note 27, at 9 (explaining that, “since
Watergate,” the executive branch has “honed and developed” a “comprehensive doctrine of executive
privilege . . . in White House statements, OLC opinions, letters to Congress, and court filings.”).
45. See infra Part I. For discussions of OLC’s own institutional bias toward executive power, see,
for example, Morrison, supra note 43, at 1455, 1501–02; William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 511–12 (2008).
46. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the
Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 398 (2008); Marshall, supra note 45, at 511.
47. Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 558. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 510–14.
48. See ROZELL, supra note 11, at 40; Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1383, 1433 (1974).
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papers in the public interest.” 49 To support these sweeping claims, Eisenhower’s Deputy Attorney General, William Rogers, submitted a memorandum (“the Rogers memorandum”) to a Senate subcommittee, reciting
purportedly analogous historical precedents. 50
The Rogers memorandum and its influence illustrate one problem with
the use of historical gloss. That is, the tendency of those invoking it to cite
relatively mild past exertions of power to support bolder, present-day actions. 51 In the case of the Rogers memorandum, the cited examples do not
bear the weight placed on them. For example, historian J.R. Wiggins observed in 1963 that, of the two episodes that Rogers cited from the Washington Administration: “‘The first . . . turns out to be a case wherein the
President, without any objection, furnished all the papers which the Congress
requested,’ while the second ‘did not involve at all the President’s broad
powers to withhold, but related to the treaty powers of the House.’” 52 Other
scholars have pointed out the inadequacy of Roger’s examples. 53 “Nonetheless, the Rogers memorandum was treated as a ‘bible for the executive
branch’ for years, and modern administrations continue to trace the notion
of a sweeping executive privilege back to the Washington Administration.”54
Relatedly, insofar as historical gloss arguments rely on the notion that
past congresses acquiesced in the executive branch’s actions, 55 they ignore
the “reality of how the political branches actually interact.”56 They assume a
Madisonian model, whereby each political branch is motivated to guard its
institutional prerogatives and to check encroachments by the other. 57 The
well-documented reality, however, is quite the opposite. Due to the structural
differences between the branches and other factors including partisanship,
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 42 Side A
11/23/2020 10:40:39

49. Texts of Eisenhower Letter and Brownell Memorandum on Testimony in Senate Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1954, at 24.
50. Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 555 (citing William P. Rogers, Constitutional Law: The Papers of
the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A. J. 941 (1958)).
51. See Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1405, 1409–14, 1421–24 (2010) (explaining that defenders of a presidential power to circumvent statutory limits draw misleadingly from historical episodes that did not entail
such radical claims).
52. J.R. Wiggins, Lawyers as Judges of History, 75 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASS. HISTORICAL
SOC’Y 84, 103 (1963) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 555).
53. See sources cited in Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 556 n.42.
54. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 164 (1974) (cited in
Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 556).
55. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 432 (2012) (explaining that commentators frequently treat historical gloss as constitutionally significant “only if [one] branch can be deemed to have acquiesced in the practice [of the other
branch] over time.”).
56. Id. at 414.
57. Id. at 438–40.
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58. Id.
59. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
61. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U. S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, No. 19-5331 at 14
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).
62. Id. at 12–13 (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 17 (citing the same incident as recounted in a different document, this one a 1982 opinion
by OLC: History of Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to Provide Information Demanded by Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 752–53 (1982)).
64. Id. at 17 (referencing other examples from Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to
the Attorney General, infra note 65).
65. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Attorney General 752–55 (Dec. 14,
1982).
66. Id. at 752, 754.
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congresspersons by and large are not consistently driven by a desire to protect their institution. Presidents, on the other hand, generally are so motivated. 58 This political asymmetry is compounded by structural imbalances,
including the President’s possession of the relevant secrets in the first place
and his access to a vast and protective infrastructure, including OLC. 59
Historical gloss is invoked by courts, as well as the executive branch.
Indeed, the two uses can intertwine, with courts adopting arguments made
by the executive in litigation, and the latter informed by OLC opinions.60
The panel decision in McGahn exemplifies this phenomenon. Judge Griffith
dismissed Senate Select Committee and a few other cases in which “courts
in [the D.C.] circuit . . . agreed to resolve . . . interbranch information disputes” as “innovations of the 1970s.”61 The longer and more important history, he said, was the nearly two centuries prior to the 1970s, when
“interbranch information disputes” took place but “‘neither branch thought
to submit [them] to the courts.’” 62 To support his point, Griffith cites one of
the Washington Administration episodes recounted in the Rogers memorandum. 63 He also references episodes collected in a 1982 OLC memorandum.64
Judge Griffith’s reasoning illustrates the potential pitfalls of historical
gloss and the tendency of such errors to favor the executive. First, many of
the executive branch precedents recounted in the 1982 OLC memorandum
bear little resemblance to the Trump Administration’s blanket claim of testimonial immunity. For example, the episodes cited from the first three presidential administrations amount, at most, to reasoned explanations by
Presidents regarding their decisions to withhold specific documents or pieces
of information. 65 In some cases, the requesting congressional body itself invited the President to withhold such parts as he deemed appropriate. 66 More
broadly, Judge Griffith ignores the historical evolution of executive privilege
disputes from case-by-case, fact-driven negotiations over particular items of
information, to categorical refusals to turn over entire classes of

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 43 Side A

11/23/2020 10:40:39

KITROSSER MACRO 1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

10/18/2020 3:52 PM

PRECEDENT AND PRIVILEGE

529

information. 67 Indeed, the dawn of an era of modern, categorical conceptions
of executive privilege is epitomized by the coining of the privilege’s name
and the development of the sweeping candor rationale in the Eisenhower
Administration.68 When considered in light of this historical trajectory, the
case law of the 1970s appears to be an unsurprising response to new developments rather than a kooky experiment of the times. Finally, the McGahn
majority overlooks practical asymmetries between the executive and the legislature that make difficult and unlikely the defensive legislative maneuvers
suggested by Judge Griffith. 69
III. TRUMP: BUILDING ON THE (PRECEDENTIAL) INHERITANCE
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67. Shaub, supra note 27 (discussing this evolution); HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING
ACCOUNTABILITY 88–94 (2015).
68. See Texts of Eisenhower Letter and Brownell Memorandum on Testimony in Senate Inquiry,
supra note 49.
69. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
70. See Shaub, supra note 27, at 39 (drawing a similar conclusion: “[T]he Trump Administration’s
positions reflect the extremity of the executive branch doctrine that has been developing for some time.
Although some positions are undoubtedly new – and extreme – they are grounded in the same theoretical
construct” as previous assertions).
71. Schaub does a very impressive deep dive into the concept and history of a prophylactic executive privilege in Schaub, supra note 27.
72. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
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President Trump thus is hardly the first to use executive privilege aggressively. The candor rationale, for example, was developed well before the
Trump Administration. This Administration also was not the first to claim
full testimonial immunity for high-level advisors, to urge courts to stay out
of executive privilege disputes, or to attempt to reap the privilege’s benefits
without formally claiming it.
The Trump Administration has, however, combined some newly aggressive uses of the privilege with a broader campaign against accountability
that seeks effectively to immunize the President from meaningful congressional oversight. 70 As for executive privilege, President Trump has broken
new ground in two main respects. First, his Administration has made regular
and especially bold use of a prophylactic privilege 71—that is, of the mere
possibility that Trump might one day wish to invoke the privilege—as a basis
for refusing to disclose information. Second, combining multiple bases for
non-cooperation, including testimonial immunity and a type of prophylactic
privilege,72 Trump issued a sweeping directive to his entire Administration
forbidding cooperation with any congressional requests for information
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relating to the recent impeachment proceedings.73 More so, all of this has
taken place against a backdrop in which the President has repeatedly sought
to stifle unwelcome information and opinions in other ways, including
openly retaliating against members of his Administration who did testify in
the impeachment proceedings and threatening the whistleblower who first
raised an alarm over the events that led to those proceedings.74
The Trump Administration invoked a prophylactic privilege in newly
expansive ways well before the events that precipitated impeachment took
place. Indeed, over a few weeks in the summer of 2017 alone, several Administration officials refused to answer any congressional questions involving their conversations with the President or with other high-level officials,
purportedly to preserve the President’s ability to assert executive privilege
at some point regarding such conversations.75 The news media reported on
these events, particularly after then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions used the
prophylactic privilege (or the “non-privileged privilege,” as law professor
Stephen Vladeck called it during a radio program discussion about Sessions’
testimony). 76 In response to this attention, the Administration turned to history’s gloss. Among other things, the Justice Department circulated two
1982 memoranda: an OLC opinion discussing the nature and scope of executive privilege for communications between the Attorney General and the
President, and a memorandum from President Ronald Reagan to the heads
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73. Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel for President Trump, to Nancy Pelosi, House Speaker;
Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Comm.; Adam B. Schiff, Chairman of Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence; and Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman of Comm. on Oversight and Reform 7 (Oct.
8, 2019) [hereinafter Cipollone Letter] (“President Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate
in this partisan inquiry under these circumstances”); id. at 8 (“the President cannot allow your constitutionally illegitimate proceedings to distract him and those in the Executive Branch from their work on
behalf of the American people.”). See also Michael Stern, Why Officials Keep Testifying Despite White
House Counsel’s Letter on Impeachment Inquiry, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66742/why-officials-keep-testifying-despite-white-house-counsels-letter-on-impeachment-inquiry/ [https://perma.cc/2SJ7-9Z23] (explaining that Cipollone undoubtedly expected that his letter
“would be understood as a directive that [current executive branch] employees should not testify before
Congress in connection with the impeachment inquiry,” and citing a federal judge’s understanding that
“‘the White House has flatly stated that the Administration will not cooperate with congressional requests
for information.’”).
74. I described some of the President’s earliest threats against the whistleblower in Heidi Kitrosser,
Don’t Forget the Cover-Up(s): On Trump’s Abuse of the Executive’s Secret-Keeping Powers, ACS (Sept.
30, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/dont-forget-the-cover-ups-on-trumps-abuse-of-the-executives-secret-keeping-powers/ [https://perma.cc/4TH6-L8RH]. For discussion of the President’s retaliatory actions during and following the impeachment proceedings, see, for example, Maggie Haberman
et al., Trump to Fire Intelligence Watchdog Who Had Key Role in Ukraine Complaint, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/us/trump-inspector-general-intelligence-fired.html
[https://perma.cc/V7HA-6NNB].
75. I discuss the summer 2017 events in detail in Kitrosser, supra note 10.
76. Id. at 547 n.6 (quoting All Things Considered: In Refusal to Answer Questions, Sessions Denies
Claiming Executive Privilege, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 13, 2017)).
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77. See Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 562–64.
78. Memorandum from President Ronald Reagan to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies 1 (Nov. 4, 1982).
79. Id. at 2.
80. Kitrosser, supra note 10, at 561.
81. Id.
82. Cipollone Letter, supra note 73, at 5.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 7.
85. See supra note 73.
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of executive departments and agencies, entitled “Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information.” 77 As I have detailed
elsewhere, however, the Trump Administration acted far more aggressively
than either memorandum prescribed or purported to authorize. For example,
the Reagan memorandum stressed that “executive privilege will be asserted
only in the most compelling circumstances,” and only as a last resort when
“good faith negotiations” fail.78 The same memorandum also instructed that,
in the rare cases in which “it is determined that compliance [with a congressional request] raises a substantial question of executive privilege,” Congress
should be asked to hold its request in abeyance while the Administration determines whether to comply or to invoke executive privilege. 79 Neither Sessions nor the other Trump Administration officials invoking the prophylactic
privilege, however, followed up after refusing to answer questions.80 Nor, to
their discredit, did the congressional committees that sought the information
in the first place. 81
The Trump Administration upped the ante further after the House of
Representatives initiated impeachment inquiries in the fall of 2019. On October 8th, Pat Cipollone, the counsel to the President, sent a scathing letter
to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and three House committee chairs,
decrying the impeachment process as a “naked political strategy” being
“used by a political party that fear[s] for its prospects against the sitting President in the next election.”82 Cipollone also accused the House Democrats of
relying on unfair procedures because they “know that a fair process would
expose the lack of any basis for [their] inquiry.” 83 Given these objections,
Cipollone announced that “President Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry under these circumstances.” 84
As Cipollone’s letter promised, the White House refused to cooperate
with any of the House’s requests for information and urged all administration
officials to follow suit.85 Ultimately, the Administration broke its justifications for this position into three main categories: testimonial immunity; the
notion that House committees had no legitimate legislative or oversight
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86. Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump (for Senate Impeachment Proceedings) at 2–
3, 35–46.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 37 n.2.
89. Id. at 37 n.253.
90. Id. at 2 n.11.
91. See Shaub, supra note 27, at 58 (explaining that the Trump Administration did not formally
invoke executive privilege in the House or Senate impeachment proceedings).
92. See supra Part I.
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reasons to request information until the House formally voted to initiate impeachment proceedings in late October; and the fact that agency counsel (but
not outside counsel) were barred from participating in depositions of agency
officials. 86 To support these rationales, the President relied heavily on OLC
opinions, including several solicited by the Administration in the course of
the impeachment proceedings. 87 For example, the administration explained
that it concluded, “only after securing advice from” OLC, that “all subpoenas
issued before the adoption of” the House impeachment resolution “were unauthorized and invalid” and remained so even after the resolution was
adopted. 88 Although the OLC opinion that it cited to this effect was dated
January 19, 2020—one day before the Administration filed its impeachment
trial memorandum making this argument and several months after the subpoenas were issued89—it explained that OLC had provided this advice orally
and then “memorialized” it in its written opinion of January 19th.90
The Administration’s blanket rejection of any and all impeachment-related congressional information requests marks a dangerous apotheosis in
the history of executive privilege thus far—more precisely, in the history of
executive privilege and its shadow effect, since the Trump Administration
did not formally invoke executive privilege in the impeachment proceedings. 91 As we have seen, executive privilege for decades has been invoked
(or alluded to without formal invocation) in service of increasingly broad,
even categorical refusals to produce entire categories of witnesses or documentary information. 92 In this case, the President cobbled together three rationales—each tenuous in its own right—to justify a complete, nonnegotiable rejection of any and all congressional information requests relating to impeachment. Apart from this refusal’s sheer breadth, it is alarming
that it was tendered in the face of a presidential impeachment investigation.
With the possible exception of a single re-election opportunity, impeachment
is the most significant means by which a coordinate political branch, and
through it American voters, may investigate and check presidential abuses
of power. Indeed, impeachment offers a considerably more focused opportunity for oversight and accountability than does re-election. In a presidential
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93. Articles of Impeachment Against Donald J. Trump, Article II: Obstruction of Congress.
94. Articles of Impeachment Against Donald J. Trump, Article I: Abuse of Power.
95. Articles of Impeachment Against Donald J. Trump, Article II: Obstruction of Congress.
96. Id. In their trial brief to the Senate, the House Impeachment Managers elaborated that “President Trump is an aberration among Presidents in refusing any and all cooperation in a House impeachment investigation,” recounting that “even President Nixon produced numerous documents in response
to Congressional subpoenas” and instructed White House staff members to testify under oath when requested by the House. House Impeachment Brief in the Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, at 33.
97. House Impeachment Brief in the Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, at 35.
98. Id.
99. Trump Impeachment Brief in the Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, at 2–4, 35–36, 47–50.
100. Id.
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election, each voter has but a single vote in which to channel all of their
concerns about a plethora of matters including domestic policy, foreign policy, personal fitness, and corruption. An impeachment process, in contrast,
hones in on identified, alleged abuses of power. It also serves as a potential
curative for abuses that themselves taint elections, including presidential efforts to shield politically damaging information from public view.
The House conveyed its own concern about these developments in its
second article of impeachment. 93 The first article charged President Trump
with “abuse of power” for attempting to condition U.S. aid to Ukraine on
Ukraine’s investigating Trump’s domestic political rival.94 The second article charged Trump with “obstruction of Congress.” 95 The House did not base
the second article on any particular refusal to produce information. Rather,
it emphasized the totality of the Administration’s intransigence, charging
that the President “sought to arrogate to himself the right to determine the
propriety, scope, and nature of an impeachment inquiry into his own conduct,
as well as the unilateral prerogative to deny any and all information to the
House of Representatives in the exercise of its ‘sole Power of Impeachment.’” 96 In its trial brief to the Senate, the House observed as well that the
President attempted “to penalize and intimidate” those Administration members who defied him and cooperated with the House. 97 “These efforts included President Trump’s sustained attacks on the anonymous
whistleblower, and his public statements designed to discourage witnesses
from coming forward and to embarrass those who did testify.” 98
The President argued, of course, that both Articles of Impeachment
should be rejected. With respect to the second article, he emphasized that he
had merely sought to protect the constitutional prerogatives of his office in
refusing to comply with subpoenas. 99 Indeed, he warned that the House itself
endangered the separation of powers by seeking to impeach him for exercising those prerogatives. 100 The President also insisted that the House had
available to it and should have used other means short of impeachment to
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enforce its subpoenas, including turning to the courts for relief.101 By bypassing these other avenues, Trump concluded, the House had declared itself
“supreme not only over the Executive Branch, but also over the Judicial
Branch.” 102 At the same time that the President made these arguments to the
Senate, however, the Department of Justice argued in McGahn and in another impeachment subpoena case that “Congressional Committees cannot
sue the Executive Branch to enforce their subpoenas.”103 As we have seen,
this argument prevailed before a panel of the D.C. Circuit in McGahn. 104 For
its part, the McGahn panel observed that, among the House’s alternatives to
seeking judicial relief is its ability to “pass[] articles of impeachment.” 105
CONCLUSION: THE TRUMP ERA AND THE GLOSS OF HISTORY
On February 5, 2020, the Senate voted to acquit President Trump on
both counts of impeachment.106 On the first count, for abuse of power, one
Senator—Republican Mitt Romney of Utah—became the first ever to vote
to convict a President of his own party in an impeachment trial.107 Romney
joined all other Senate Republicans by voting to acquit on the second count,
for obstruction of Congress. 108 With respect to the second count, Romney
“acknowledged that Trump threw up ‘a barrage of efforts’ to keep the House
from receiving documents or testimony from key Administration officials
with firsthand knowledge.” 109 He concluded, however, that Trump “‘did
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101. Id. at 49–50.
102. Id. at 50. Similarly, the Senate Majority Leader, Republican Mitch McConnell of Kentucky,
maintained that the House was required to turn to the courts to enforce its subpoenas. Bob Bauer, The
Trump Impeachment and the Question of Precedent, LAWFARE (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-impeachment-and-question-precedent [https://perma.cc/NT2J-BURE].
103. House Impeachment Brief in the Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, at 39 n.228 (citing Brief
for Def-Appellant at 2, 32–33; Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9,
2019); Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summ. J. at 19–20; Kupperman v. U.S. House
of Representatives, No. 19–3224 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2019)). See also Kyle Cheney, House Withdraws
Subpoena for Top Bolton Aide, POLITICO
(Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/06/house-withdraws-bolton-aide-subpoena-066941
[https://perma.cc/ZN69SPQY] (discussing withdrawal of Kupperman subpoena).
104. See supra Part I.
105. McGahn, No. 19-5331 at 14.
106. Nicholas Fandos, Trump Acquitted of Two Impeachment Charges in Near Party-Line Vote,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/trump-acquitted-impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/627T-SQDP].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Dan Balz & Robert Costa, Romney Votes to Convict Trump on Charge of Abuse of Power,
becoming the Lone Republican to Break Ranks, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-his-vote-to-convict-trump-on-abuse-of-power-romney-will-break-with-hisparty—and-awaits-the-consequences/2020/02/05/a76dce74-4841-11ea-ab15-b5df3261b710_story.html
[https://perma.cc/R7XK-GKYK].
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follow the law, and the House did not take the time to go to the courts as . . .
they should have.’” 110
Some commentators have lamented that the acquittal vote sets a damaging precedent. They express fear that future Presidents will refuse to cooperate with congressional impeachment investigations, pointing to Trump’s
example to legitimate their intransigence.111 Such concerns are heightened
by the fact that President Trump not only refused to cooperate; he also sought
repeatedly to intimidate the anonymous whistleblower who precipitated the
proceedings. 112 Indeed, one Senator—Republican Rand Paul of Kentucky—
attempted several times to “out” the whistleblower’s identity, an effort applauded by President Trump and several other congressional Republicans. 113
There are, of course, valid bases to fear the precedent-setting effect of
these events. As we have seen, presidential power tends to expand over time.
More so, historical gloss is among the agents of its progress. Yet not every
step forward for presidential power augers additional movements in the same
direction. Occasionally, missteps are identified as such, and course corrections are made.
Indeed, scholars increasingly take a nuanced look at presidential precedent, examining the circumstances under which it warrants (or does not warrant) adherence—and under which it is likely to gain (or not to gain) as
much—in future administrations. For example, Deborah Pearlstein considers
in a new paper how presidential actions sometimes come to be treated, in
time, as anti-canonical. 114 And Josh Chafetz and David Pozen recently
crafted a taxonomy of ways in which constitutional norms break down. 115
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110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 102; Harry Litman, Will Acquittal Kill the Impeachment Clause?
The Voters Get the Final Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2020, 6:00 AM). https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/05/will-acquittal-kill-impeachment-clause-voters-get-final-say/
[https://perma.cc/68L6-ERA8]; Donna Brazile, Trump’s Politically-Driven Acquittal Sets Horrible Precedent, Weakens Rule of Law, FOX NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/donna-brazile-trump-acquittal-in-impeachment-trial-will-go-down-in-history-as-a-sad-day-for-democracy
[https://perma.cc/BCR4-YB6E].
112. See Kitrosser, supra note 74.
113. See, e.g., Kyle Cheney & Burgess Everett, Rand Paul Reads Alleged Whistleblower’s Name
and Republicans ‘Fine’ With It, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/04/rand-paul-reads-alleged-whistleblowers-name-senate-floor-110684
[https://perma.cc/7MTT-YV3Z]; Bobby Allyn, Trump is Criticized After Sharing Name of Alleged Whistleblower on Twitter, NPR (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/29/792222297/trump-comesunder-fire-after-sharing-name-on-twitter-of-alleged-whistleblower
[https://perma.cc/W3EX-K3QJ];
Adam Gopnik, Why is Trump Obsessed with Outing the Whistle-Blower?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-is-trump-obsessed-with-outing-the-whistleblower [https://perma.cc/6NDG-S97C].
114. See Pearlstein, supra note 9.
115. Josh Chafetz & David Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430,
1435–36 (2018).
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They suggest, among other things, that brazen and abrupt course deviations
are more likely to engender backlash than are incremental shifts over time.116
As for Donald Trump’s intransigence toward congressional oversight,
its legacy is yet unwritten. At least two aspects of it could, indeed, lend themselves to a ratchet effect. First, Trump’s behavior can be linked to a historical
trajectory of expanded executive power, enabling his Administration—and
future Presidents and their allies—to treat it as relatively unremarkable in
nature. Second, the sheer amount of norm-flouting in the Trump Administration 117 makes it difficult for the public, the media, and political opponents to
sustain a focus on any one example. Trump may shift the ground beneath us
partly by exhausting us. 118
On the other hand, the volume and magnitude of Trump’s eyebrowraising behavior—including his scorched earth approach to defying an impeachment investigation—might have quite the opposite effect. That is, they
might lead legal elites, politicians, and the public to look closely at the
broader historical trajectory in which Trump seeks to place himself. Perhaps
Trump’s actions will—like those of Richard Nixon years earlier—generate
a broader rethinking of this arc, with its expansive conceptions and uses of
executive privilege. Neither course is inevitable. The path or paths taken will
depend, quite simply, on our arguments and actions today, and those of future generations tomorrow.
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116. Id. at 1435.
117. Chafetz and Pozen allude to some notable examples from the Trump administration. As they
put it:
[W]e think we can safely say that it is bad for a president or presidential candidate to: lie constantly, deny
the validity of fairly administered elections, threaten to jail political opponents, maintain business interests while in public office in a manner that invites foreign governments and political allies to funnel
money toward those interests, make racist remarks and wink at white supremacists, strive to delegitimize
the press, invite a foreign government to interfere in American electoral processes, appoint unqualified
friends and family members to important government positions, and so on.
Id. at 1451.
118. Many political commentators have referred to the phenomenon of “Trump fatigue.” See, e.g.,
Jack Shafer, Trump Fatigue? Spare Me, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/17/spare-me-your-trump-exhaustion-086597 [https://perma.cc/8DF7-SCW8] (citing several examples of such commentary).

